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EU Unilateralism and the Law of the Sea
Alan Boyle*
Professor of Public International Law, University of Edinburgh
Introduction: Unilateralism in the Law of the Sea
The subject of this paper is plainly inspired by the EU’s introduction of reg-
ulations which will progressively restrict single hull oil tankers from using EU
ports.1 In summary, such tankers will not be permitted to carry heavy oil, they
will be subject to an accelerated phasing-out scheme and there will be more
stringent structural inspections for older ships. These regulations are unilateral
only in the sense that the EU has chosen to advance their entry into force
ahead of the date for amendments to the MARPOL Convention agreed at
IMO.2 They are otherwise neither unprecedented nor opposed by other mari-
time states. Moreover, this is by no means the ﬁrst time that unilateral action
has altered the rights of other states at sea, and before turning to the speciﬁc
question of the opposability of the EU regulations to vessels of non-EU states,
it is necessary to stand back and view the EU’s practice in a broader context.
First, let us look brieﬂy at how unilateral action has inﬂuenced—or in some
cases failed to inﬂuence—the law of the sea. Some of the most important
developments in the law of the sea since 1945 have been the product of uni-
lateral actions by a single state or a small group of states. The Truman Proclamation
claiming jurisdiction over the contiguous continental shelf is the best-known
example of a claim by a single state leading to the emergence of a whole new
body of law, later codiﬁed in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and
subsequently conﬁrmed as customary law in the 1969 North Sea Continental
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Shelf case.3 The crucial element which led to this outcome was the positive
response of other states, in some cases claiming their own shelf, in others sim-
ply acquiescing in claims made by other states. No state contended that the
US claim to continental shelf jurisdiction was illegal or a violation of the
rights of other states over the high seas. Nor had any state previously claimed
that continental shelf resources were the common property of all states, but
the matter had until then scarcely seemed worth considering. The US was in
effect asserting an entirely novel rule in respect of resources that were previ-
ously unclaimed and largely unknown.4 When the claim did come, its effect
was almost immediately formative of new law.
Iceland’s attempt to extend coastal state jurisdiction over high seas ﬁsheries
was a less successful example of unilateralism. Iceland opposed the establish-
ment of the six-plus-six-n.m. formula for costal state jurisdiction over ﬁsheries
proposed at UNCLOS I and II. For this reason it did not participate in the
1964 European Fisheries Convention. Its declaration of a 12-mile territorial
sea provoked the ﬁrst dispute with the UK, but this was settled by negotia-
tion. The extension of its exclusive ﬁshery zone to ﬁfty n.m. in 1972, how-
ever, provoked further disputes with the UK and Germany which were
submitted to the International Court of Justice. In the Icelandic Fisheries
cases5 the Court was asked to decide on the legality of Iceland’s unilateral
extension of its ﬁsheries jurisdiction, on the rights of the UK and the Federal
Republic of Germany to continue to ﬁsh in this area, and on requirements 
for co-operation in adopting conservation measures. The Court found that 
Iceland’s claim to a 12-mile exclusive zone was not unlawful, but that the UK
and Germany had not acquiesced in or accepted Iceland’s claim to an exclu-
sive zone beyond that limit. The ﬁfty-mile exclusive zone claimed by Iceland
was therefore “not opposable” to these states. The UK and Germany retained
rights to ﬁsh beyond Iceland’s 12-mile zone, based on historic exercise of high
seas freedoms, but Iceland did have preferential rights in the allocation of
quotas.
Here we can see the risks of unilateralism when not acquiesced in or gen-
erally supported by other states. What this case shows is that existing law can-
not be changed unilaterally. The rights of other states cannot be taken away
without their agreement or acquiescence. That is the most fundamental weak-
ness of acting alone. However creative or desirable in policy terms, such
action is only effective if others also follow the lead. If they do not, a dispute
is inevitable.
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Politics and International Law (London, 1979), Ch. 6; M. Nordquist, UNCLOS Commentary
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Nevertheless, Iceland’s unilateralism was not without positive beneﬁts.
Firstly, its action was not found to be illegal, despite infringing high seas free-
doms. The 50-mile exclusive zone would thus be effective against other states
which did not object. Second, and much more importantly, the court’s judg-
ment left open the possibility of negotiated change. The precedent set by
Iceland did appeal to a number of other states, and extended coastal state 
jurisdiction quickly became a central issue in the UNCLOS III negotiations
which commenced in 1974. The 200-mile exclusive economic zone agreed at
UNCLOS III in 1976 gave coastal states, including Iceland, a far broader mar-
gin of exclusive jurisdiction over ﬁsheries than Iceland had itself claimed.6 Only
two years after their victory in court, the UK and Germany lost the ﬁshing
rights in Icelandic waters which they had historically exercised over centuries.
Unilateralism may not itself change the law, but it can become an important
catalyst for change through negotiation. Within ten years the ICJ had found
that the new EEZ represented customary international law.7
Canada’s experience in two separate disputes with other states over mari-
time jurisdiction has been very similar. In 1970 Canada adopted the Arctic
Waters Pollution Act, giving itself then unprecedented powers to regulate pol-
lution and navigation in a 50-mile zone of Arctic waters. The Act applied to
foreign vessels, required them to meet Canadian construction standards for
Arctic waters and resulted in protests from the USA. There was little the US
could do, however, since Canada had thoughtfully redrafted its acceptance of
the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction to exclude such maritime disputes. Although
limited in scope, an inﬂuential principle had successfully been established. 
A strong lobby at the UNCLOS III conference, led by Canada and Australia
and supported by the majority of developing states, sought a more general
extension of coastal state pollution jurisdiction beyond the relatively limited
changes introduced in 1973 by the MARPOL Convention.8 Reaching agree-
ment on the exclusive economic zone involved a compromise between the
more extensive claims of these states and the concerns of maritime nations.
Once coastal states had abandoned their support for a broader margin of ter-
ritorial sea, maritime states were prepared to accept the principle of extended
jurisdiction for speciﬁc purposes. The central feature of the resulting EEZ
regime is that it preserves for all states high seas freedom of navigation within
the zone, rather than the more restrictive territorial sea right of innocent pas-
sage, in contrast to earlier 200-mile claims made by a number of Latin
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13 Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, note verbale to the Canadian Embassy, 10 March 1995.
14 1995 Canada Agreed Minute on the Conservation and Management of Fish Stocks: see 34
ILM 1260, and P. Davies (1995) 44 ICLQ 927.
American states.9 However, coastal states acquired the power to regulate pol-
lution from sea-bed installations, dumping, and activities within the EEZ, but
their jurisdiction over vessels is limited to the application of international rules
for enforcement purposes only.10
Canada’s second foray into unilateral extension of maritime jurisdiction had
a similar outcome. Under the 1994 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and
accompanying regulations Canada extended its ﬁsheries enforcement jurisdic-
tion to cover certain high seas stocks beyond the EEZ. Fishing by Spanish and
Portuguese vessels was prohibited or controlled; powers of arrest were then
exercised in respect of at least one vessel, the Estai, a Spanish trawler found
contravening the act 245 miles off Canada. Canada’s action was supported
only by Chile; it represented a serious challenge to the consensus reached dur-
ing the UNCLOS III negotiations and enshrined in the 1982 Convention. Not
surprisingly, Spain initiated a case before the ICJ. However, Canada had once
again revised its ICJ declaration in order to exclude such disputes. The case
was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.11
Clearly this legislation and its enforcement violated general international
law (Canada was not then a party to UNCLOS). On any view, and except in
cases of hot pursuit, no state had the right to interfere with foreign ﬁshing ves-
sels on the high seas beyond the EEZ.12 Quite rightly, Spain’s position was
that “In carrying out the said boarding operation, the Canadian authorities breached
the universally accepted norm of customary international law codiﬁed in
Article 92 and articles to the same effect of the 1982 Convention of the Law
of the Sea, according to which ships on the high seas shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the ﬂag State. . . .”13 Nevertheless, if Canada was in
this case seriously violating international law, its actions once again had signiﬁcant
effects. First, an agreement on ﬁsheries conservation measures was negotiated
with the EC.14 Secondly, the question of conservation of straddling ﬁsh stocks
was further addressed in UN negotiations and in 1995 an international agree-
ment “implementing” the existing UNCLOS provisions was adopted. While
this agreement did not go as far as Canada had wanted, it did introduce new
measures for conservation of high seas stocks and high seas enforcement by
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18 Swordﬁsh case, ITLOS No. 7 (2001).
non-ﬂag states.15 If Canada’s action did not itself change the law it once again
contributed to the pressure for change coming from other states.
Finally, the least successful exponent of unilateral action has been Chile. In
1998 Chile and the European Community were in dispute about conservation
of swordﬁsh stocks in the southeast Paciﬁc. In order to put pressure on the
EC to agree to abide by Chilean ﬁsheries conservation regulations, Chile
closed its ports to EC ﬁshing vessels. It also negotiated a regional ﬁsheries
agreement16 with neighbouring states under which EC states would be denied
the automatic right to share in high seas catch quotas. The EC initiated pro-
ceedings in the WTO, alleging violation of the GATT agreement’s provisions
on transit of goods through ports and import restrictions.17 Chile responded by
initiating proceedings under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
alleging violation of articles on conservation of migratory ﬁsh stocks on the
high seas.18 The EC counter-sued, alleging violation of the same UNCLOS
provisions, as well as others on regional co-operation and abuse of rights. The
dispute was provisionally settled before either case could be heard by the
WTO or the ITLOS.
How far Chile’s actions amounted to a violation of international law is a
matter of dispute between the parties. Chile carefully did not assert the right
to arrest EC vessels at sea; in this respect its jurisdictional claims were signiﬁcantly
different from Canada’s. On the other hand the Galapagos Agreement did
appear to contravene the 1982 UNCLOS by denying third states their right to
participate in high seas ﬁshing. Chile has so far gained little from its unilat-
eralism in this dispute, apart from agreement on a scientiﬁc research pro-
gramme into the state of the stocks. The Galapagos Agreement has not entered
into force; the EC has not agreed to abide by Chilean conservation measures; the
law has not changed. Unlike Canada, Chile is a party to the 1982 UNCLOS.
The Swordﬁsh dispute falls squarely within the compulsory dispute settle-
ment provisions of UNCLOS and of the WTO, albeit in respect of different
issues. The EC is thus in a good position to enforce its treaty rights against
Chile—which is precisely the point of UNCLOS compulsory dispute settle-
ment. In this context, unilateralism ceases to be a useful tool for legal change.
What conclusions follow from this brief survey? First, that in some cases
unilateralism has resulted either in changes to customary law or treaty law, in
others it has not. This is an obvious point. In this respect the reaction of other
states matters crucially. Secondly, where compulsory dispute settlement is
available, unilateralism is a particularly risky strategy, especially where the
challenge is to provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS. It must always be remembered
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that this treaty was negotiated by consensus as a package deal. Its integrity is
reinforced by the prohibition of reservations and inter se modiﬁcations that
affect the rights of other states.19 UNCLOS has in effect a special status, which
UNCLOS tribunals are more likely to protect. Changes can be made, but by
agreement, not by unilateral action. No international actor is more aware of
this than the EU, as its resolute and successful resistance to Chilean pressure
in the Swordﬁsh case shows. From this perspective it may well be that older
examples of successful unilateralism in the law of the sea are nowadays likely
to be misleading. Establishing a novel precedent in customary law is one
thing; unravelling a laboriously negotiated and almost universally accepted
treaty is quite another.
For the EU, emulating such unilateralism is likely to be a double-edged
sword. If indulged in successfully, other states will simply follow whatever
precedent has been established. Extending EU jurisdiction over foreign ships
is an obvious example. Any claim made by the EU will simply encourage
other states to make similar claims against EU vessels. The short-lived attempt
to apply elements of EU labour law to certain foreign vessels using EU ports
is a case in point.20 Similarly, the EU cannot extend its powers over foreign
ﬁshing vessels without undermining the position of its own vessels in foreign
ports and ﬁshing grounds. So much is common sense. Unsuccessful unilater-
alism is far more likely today to result not merely in protest, but in litigation,
and probable defeat. Such setbacks are unlikely to be beneﬁcial to whatever
position the EU wishes to advance.
A careful appreciation of the powers and responsibilities of coastal and port
states under UNCLOS is thus an essential preliminary to consideration of the
EU’s unilateralism in respect of single-hull oil tankers. The real question here
is not whether such action is likely to change the law, but whether it can be
done within the limits of existing law.
I. Regulation of Access to Ports
Firstly, it is accepted in all of the literature that there is no general right of
access to ports in international law and that no such right is referred to in the
1982 UNCLOS. On the contrary it is implicit in UNCLOS Articles 25, 211(3)
and 255 that states are entitled to regulate or deny access to ports. In the
Military and Paramilitary Activities case the International Court of Justice also
accepted that a state has the sovereign right to regulate access to its ports.21
Only a dictum in the 1958 Aramco Arbitration holds otherwise: “According to
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a great principle of public international law, the ports of every state must be
open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital inter-
ests of the state so require”.22 It has been convincingly argued that this dictum
is wrong.23 It has also been convincingly argued that the 1923 Convention and
Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports does not codify and has
not generated a rule of customary international law on access to ports.24 It fol-
lows that in internal waters, including ports, the coastal state is free to apply
national laws and determine conditions of entry for foreign vessels, subject
only to compliance with the due publicity requirements of Article 211(3) of
UNCLOS.
Secondly, the best argument that could be made for port access is based on
the right of transit for goods and vessels under GATT Article V. This was the
EC’s position in the WTO proceedings initiated in the Swordﬁsh case. Article
V provides in part:
1. Goods. . . ., and also vessels and other means of transport, shall be deemed to 
be in transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage across 
such territory. . . . is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminat-
ing beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the trafﬁc
passes. . . .
2. There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting
party. . . . No distinction shall be made which is based on the ﬂag of the vessels,
the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances
relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.
3.–7. [omitted]
This article has never been interpreted or applied in any WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Body decision. It is clear that it does not apply to ships entering ports
in the state of ﬁnal destination of the cargo they carry. Oil tankers coming to
the UK are thus unlikely to be covered. Equally, oil tankers docking at Rotter-
dam and discharging their cargo for onward distribution elsewhere in Europe
will be covered. The principal objective of the article is to eliminate discrim-
inatory treatment of vessels from different countries. Banning, or applying dif-
ferent entry requirements to vessels from some states, while allowing entry to
those from other states, might well pose problems under Article V. But it also
seems reasonably evident that the article is not as such concerned with regu-
lations affecting construction, safety, or operating standards, provided these 
are not applied in a discriminatory fashion. A ban on all single hull tankers is
thus unlikely to be contrary to Article V. A state which operated only single-
hull tankers might possibly argue that such a ban is in fact if not in form 
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discriminatory if other states are not similarly affected. In that unlikely even-
tuality, Article XX could be relied on as a defence, provided it could be shown
that the ban was related to the conservation of “exhaustible natural resources”
(e.g. the sea).
Thirdly, there may also be a claim to port access under UNCLOS Article
300. That Article provides: “States parties shall fulﬁl in good faith the obliga-
tions assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction
and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not
constitute an abuse of right.” It is acknowledged in the Convention that states
have the right to regulate access to ports. Any use of that right in bad faith
may therefore amount to a violation of Article 300. So might any abuse of the
right to regulate access. Churchill and Lowe formulate the abuse of right argu-
ment as follows: “It is, however, possible that closures or conditions of access
which are patently unreasonable or discriminatory might be held to amount to
an abus de droit, for which the coastal state might be internationally respon-
sible even if there were no right of entry to the port.”25
The EC’s position in the Swordﬁsh case was that Chile had not acted in
good faith and/or had committed an abuse of right by closing its ports to EC
ﬁshing vessels in an unreasonable and discriminatory manner contrary to
Article 300. This claim was dependent on showing that Chile had acted unlaw-
fully under Articles 116–119 of UNCLOS in its attempt to control EC ﬁshing
on the high seas while refusing to negotiate. Article 300 has not so far been
interpreted or applied by any tribunal, although it was part of Australia and
New Zealand’s claim in the Southern Blueﬁn Tuna case,26 and was also relied
on by Ireland in the Mox case.27 Neither of these cases involved issues of port
access.
Provided EU legislation on double hulls can genuinely be represented as
contributing to greater safety and enhanced environmental protection, and pro-
vided it is applied in a non-discriminatory manner, no violation of Article 300
is likely to result.
II. Regulation of Foreign Ships in Port
– Customary Law
There is no categorical prohibition in international law on states attempting to
apply their national law to foreign vessels using their ports. Where activities
on board the ship affect the peace and good order of the port state there is no
doubt that it is permissible to apply the local law. In Cunard v. Mellon,28 a
case concerning the application of US liquor prohibition laws to foreign ships
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in US waters, the US Supreme Court held that: “A merchant ship of one coun-
try, voluntarily entering the territorial limits of another, subjects herself to the
jurisdiction of the latter. The jurisdiction attaches in virtue of her presence. . . .
during her stay she is entitled to the protection of the laws of that place, and,
correlatively, is bound to yield obedience to them”. Although in this case the
British Government protested at the US application of its law to foreign ships,
it accepted “the strictly legal right of the United States or any other country
to impose its jurisdiction on all ships whether national or foreign, within its
territorial waters”. The UK did point out, however, that it conﬁned its own
regulation of foreign ships to matters of safety and welfare of the ship, crew
and passengers.29
It has not been usual for states to try to regulate the “internal economy” of
foreign ships while in port where the peace and good order of the port are not
affected. In particular, it has not been the normal practice to apply local labour
law to these ships. The US Supreme Court has found that most aspects of US
maritime labour legislation (the “Jones Act”) do not apply to foreign ﬂagged
vessels, even when beneﬁcially owned by US companies and operating regu-
larly to US ports.30
Although in part these decisions rest on the conclusion that as a matter 
of statutory construction Congress did not intend to legislate for foreign ves-
sels, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Lauritzen v. Larsen also noted that
“. . . courts of this and other concerned nations have generally deferred to a
non-national or international maritime law of impressive maturity and univer-
sality. It has the force of law . . . from acceptance by common consent of
civilised communities of rules designed to foster amicable and workable rela-
tions.”31 In several of these cases the British and other governments made rep-
resentations to the Supreme Court arguing that the application of local law
contravened the traditional ﬂag state jurisdiction over the internal economy of
the ship. It seems to have been the view of these governments and possibly
also of the Supreme Court that port state regulation of employment contra-
vened international law. When a proposal came before the US Congress in
1994 to apply US labour law to foreign ships the European Community made
a diplomatic protest. The evidence of diplomatic protest is important because
it shows that states have not accepted the permissibility of this kind of legis-
lation. The fact that in response to these protests the US has generally
refrained from applying its law to foreign ships is also evidence that it did not
believe it had a right to do so.
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– 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
In keeping with the traditional position, the 1982 UNCLOS places a duty to
regulate administrative, technical and social matters on the ﬂag state.32 This
duty includes the regulation of manning, labour conditions and training of
crews to the extent necessary to ensure safety at sea. UNCLOS also prohibits
a coastal state from regulating design, construction, manning or equipment of
foreign ships in passage through its territorial waters,33 unless giving effect to
generally accepted international standards on these matters found in IMO and
ILO conventions.
With the sole exception of pollution offences,34 the 1982 UNCLOS contains
no provisions on port state jurisdiction; it does not prohibit port states from
regulating design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships in port
but nor does it expressly permit them to do so. In this respect the Convention
does not change or supersede existing customary law on port state jurisdiction.
– IMO Regulatory Conventions
The 1974 SOLAS Convention, the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention, and the
1978 STCW Convention set minimum international standards on construction,
manning, equipment and training to be applied and enforced by the ﬂag state
or by other states within whose jurisdiction a violation occurs. To this extent
they recognise that port states have jurisdiction in respect of construction and
equipment standards for foreign ships. However, a port state is only given
power under these treaties to inspect foreign ships in order to monitor com-
pliance with international standards, and then either to take proceedings in
accordance with its own law or to refer the ship to the ﬂag state for prosecu-
tion. The involvement of port states in inspection and monitoring of compli-
ance was recognised at its inception as a novel extension of their powers.35
No provision of these international agreements allows the port state to set
its own national standards on any of these matters, but nor do they prohibit it
from doing so. After the Exxon Valdez accident, the United States became the
ﬁrst to ban all single hull oil tankers from its ports without waiting for agree-
ment in IMO.36 The most obvious argument in favour of the lawfulness of this
response is that it falls within the customary jurisdiction of a port state to reg-
ulate matters affecting the peace and good order of the port because of the risk
of accidents and consequential pollution. No state is known to have objected
to the US action; it represents a clear precedent for introduction of the EU’s
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own double-hull regulations. Legislation of this kind remains an unusual asser-
tion of jurisdiction, however; for most states the interests of comity with other
nations and freedom of navigation have until now dictated greater restraint in
the unilateral regulation of foreign ships.37
III. Coastal State Jurisdiction
- In the Territorial Sea
The coastal state’s jurisdiction to regulate vessels depends on its sovereignty
or sovereign rights over maritime zones contiguous to its coasts. In the terri-
torial sea, the coastal state also enjoys sovereignty, and with it the power to
apply national law.38 The right to regulate environmental protection in territo-
rial waters has been assumed or asserted in national legislation, and in treaties
on such matters as dumping or pollution from ships. This right includes three
important powers: the designation of environmentally protected or particularly
sensitive sea areas,39 the designation and control of navigation routes for safety
and environmental purposes,40 and the prohibition of pollution discharges.41
In each of these respects the coastal state enjoys a substantial measure of
national discretion: it is for example free to set stricter pollution discharge
standards than the international standards required by the MARPOL Convention.
But, as we saw earlier, unlike the earlier Territorial Sea Convention of 1958,
or the 1973 MARPOL Convention, which are silent on the point, the 1982
UNCLOS speciﬁcally excludes from the coastal state’s jurisdiction the right to
regulate construction, design, equipment, and manning standards for ships,
unless giving effect to international rules and standards, which for this purpose
means primarily the MARPOL Convention, and the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea
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Convention.42 The EU would thus have no right under UNCLOS to apply its
single hull regulations to tankers in innocent passage through EU waters.
The reason for this exclusion is self-evident: if every state set its own stan-
dards on these matters ships could not freely navigate in the territorial sea of
other states. This would contravene the most important limitation on the
coastal state’s jurisdiction with regard to any of the above matters: that it must
not hamper the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea or suspend
the right in straits used for international navigation.43 This right is enjoyed 
by the vessels of all nations, and it is an essential safeguard for freedom of
maritime navigation. Foreign vessels do not thereby acquire exemption from
coastal state laws, but these laws must be in conformity with international law,
and must not have the practical effect of denying passage.44
What then can a coastal state legitimately do when a foreign vessel is found
violating international pollution regulations in the territorial sea, or when it
poses a risk of accidental pollution or environmental harm? What the coastal
state cannot do is to close its territorial waters to foreign ships in innocent
passage, even where their cargo presents a signiﬁcant environmental risk, as
in the case of oil tankers.45 Passage in these circumstances does not cease to
be innocent, and must be afforded without discrimination. At most, the coastal
state will be entitled to take certain precautionary measures to minimize the
risk: it may, for example, require ships carrying nuclear materials or other
inherently dangerous or noxious substances, such as oil or hazardous waste, to
carry documentation, observe special precautionary measures established by inter-
national agreements such as MARPOL, or conﬁne their passage to speciﬁed
sea lanes in the interests of safety, the efﬁciency of trafﬁc, and the protection
of the environment.46 Following the Braer disaster off the Shetland Islands in
1993, IMO also amended the SOLAS Convention to allow coastal states to
require ships to report their presence to coastal authorities when entering des-
ignated zones, including environmentally sensitive areas.47
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The application of these principles can be observed in state practice con-
cerning environmentally sensitive areas covered by special areas protocols, or
designated by IMO. In such cases the passage of ships may be regulated in
order to minimize the risk of adverse environmental effects or serious pollu-
tion, but here too, the important point is that while ships may be required to
avoid certain areas, the right of innocent passage is not lost.48 In 1990,
Australia obtained IMO designation of the Great Barrier Reef as a “particu-
larly sensitive sea area” within an extended territorial sea and imposed com-
pulsory pilotage requirements.49 The United States has also designated the
Florida Keys as an “area to be avoided” and prohibited the operation of tankers
in these waters under the 1972 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act.
Nor does the actual violation of regulations necessarily deprive the vessel
of its right of innocent passage. Innocent passage is deﬁned by the 1958
Territorial Sea Convention as passage which is “not prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security” of the coastal state. This vague terminology appeared
to allow coastal states ample room for subjective judgments of the question of
innocence, and it is arguably not an accurate reﬂection of the treatment of
innocent passage in the Corfu Channel case. That decision implied a rather
more objective test, and it is this approach which is much more fully reﬂected
in Article 19 of the 1982 UNCLOS. This provision was not intended to change
the law, but to clarify it in rather more satisfactory terms, which afford less
scope for potentially abusive interference with shipping. The signiﬁcant point
is that only pollution which is “wilful and serious” and contrary to the
Convention will deprive a vessel in passage of its innocent character, which
necessarily excludes accidental pollution or the risk of pollution from having
this effect. Moreover, under this formulation, single hull tankers cannot be
banned from the territorial sea, since a mere violation of construction stan-
dards will not be enough to deprive a ship of its right to innocent passage.
Only when ships do lose this right can their entry into territorial waters be
denied, or their right of passage terminated.
Customary law probably does allow the coastal state to arrest ships in the
territorial sea, however. Both the 1972 London Dumping Convention and the
1973 MARPOL Convention require coastal states to apply and enforce their
provisions against all vessels in the territorial sea, inter alia, and this right is
recognized in the 1982 UNCLOS, subject to that Convention’s provisions on
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innocent passage and the existence of clear grounds for suspecting a violation.50
However, this power will only apply to ships which violate international con-
struction standards. A violation of unilaterally adopted regulations on single
hulls would not justify arrest in the territorial sea.
The 1982 UNCLOS does not alter these basic principles of customary law
or extend the coastal state’s rights in the territorial sea. In this context its pur-
pose is simply to clarify and deﬁne the limits of those rights. The territorial
sea regime envisaged by the Convention is thus a compromise: it offers coastal
states power to control navigation and pollution, while preserving rights of
passage and international control of construction, design, equipment, and man-
ning standards.51
– In the Exclusive Economic Zone
The central feature of the EEZ regime is that it preserves for all states high
seas freedom of navigation within the zone, rather than the more restrictive
territorial sea right of innocent passage, in contrast to earlier 200-mile claims
made by a number of Latin American states.52 Coastal states acquire responsi-
bility for regulating pollution from sea-bed installations, dumping, and activi-
ties within the EEZ, but their regulatory jurisdiction over vessels is limited to
the application of international rules for enforcement purposes only.53
The effect of this regime is less radical than some coastal states had sought.
That in general it does no more than permit them to apply MARPOL and
other relevant instruments is evident from the wording of article 211(5) of the
1982 UNCLOS, which refers only to coastal state laws “conforming to and
giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards” for the
prevention, reduction, and control of vessel-source pollution.54 In this context
MARPOL regulations and possibly other international standards adopted by
IMO thus represent the normal limit of coastal state competence and act as a
necessary restraint where there is evident potential for excessive interference
with shipping.
Thus, coastal states have acquired little real discretion about the kind of pol-
lution legislation they may apply in the EEZ. In particular, as in the territorial
sea, they are denied the power to set their own construction, design, equip-
ment, and manning standards for vessels. Mandatory reporting or routeing schemes
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require IMO approval if they extend to the EEZ.55 Even in cases of special
circumstances, Article 211(6) of the Convention requires the designation of
special areas to be approved by IMO and supported by scientiﬁc and techni-
cal evidence. Unlike Article 234, such designation does not confer any power
to act unilaterally in setting construction or equipment standards for ships
entering the EEZ, although it does permit the coastal state to apply unilateral
standards relating to pollution discharges or navigation.56
Moreover, coastal states are not given full jurisdiction to enforce inter-
national regulations against ships in passage in the EEZ. They can do so if the
vessel voluntarily enters port,57 but otherwise their powers in the EEZ itself
are graduated according to the likely harm. Only when there is “clear objec-
tive evidence” of a violation of applicable international regulations resulting in
a discharge of pollution which causes or threatens to cause “major damage”
to the coastal state are arrest and prosecution permitted, but where the viola-
tion has resulted only in a “substantial discharge” causing or threatening “signiﬁcant
pollution”, the vessel may be inspected for “matters relating to the violation”,
that is, in effect, for evidence of the illegal discharge, provided this is justiﬁed
by the circumstances, including information already given by the ship.58 The
ship may in this case only be detained if necessary to prevent an unreasonable
threat of damage to the marine environment.59 Clearly, none of these provi-
sions empowers a coastal state to arrest tankers in the EEZ simply because
they violate applicable construction standards: there must in addition be a “dis-
charge” of pollution. In this form the jurisdiction of coastal states remains a
limited one for protective purposes only, but this is consistent with the nature
of their rights in the EEZ.
IV. Inter Se Agreements under UNCLOS
UNCLOS is replete with references to regional rules, regional programmes,
regional co-operation and so on. It makes speciﬁc provision for regional co-
operation in the case of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas;60 in the case of
ﬁsheries management, regional co-operation and regulation are required if the
provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS61 and the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and
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Highly Migratory Fish Stocks are to be implemented effectively. Part XII of
the Convention, dealing with protection of the marine environment, also makes
signiﬁcant reference to regional rules and standards in various contexts. Clearly,
UNCLOS does not prohibit regional agreements.
On the other hand Article 311(3) of UNCLOS limits the power of states to
conclude regional agreements which depart from its terms. A ﬁnal question
therefore is whether the EU Regulations might be a violation of this provision.
Article 311(3) speciﬁes that other agreements may modify or suspend provi-
sions of the Convention, “provided that such agreements do not relate to a
provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution
of the object and purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such
agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles embodied herein,
and that the provisions of such agreements do not affect the enjoyment by
other states parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under
this Convention.”62
Are EU regulations or directives “agreements” for the purposes of this arti-
cle? In principle there is no reason not to treat them as such. It is true that
they are not formally regarded as treaties by the EU member states and are
not registered at the UN. Nevertheless they are negotiated and adopted by
member states, albeit in co-decision with the Parliament, and their legal force
derives directly from the EU treaty. If UN Security Council resolutions can be
regarded as international agreements for the purpose of Article 103 of the UN
Charter,63 then there is some precedent for regarding other types of legally
binding subsidiary instruments adopted under treaty powers as themselves 
treaties.
The clear implication of Article 311(3) is that the drafters of the 1982 
UNCLOS sought to limit the right of parties to derogate from the Conven-
tion in later agreements. The assumption is that in the event of conﬂict the
1982 UNCLOS will prevail. When considering such clauses, the ILC com-
mentary concluded:
The chief legal relevance of a clause asserting the priority of a treaty over subse-
quent treaties which conﬂict with it therefore appears to be in making explicit the
intention of the parties to create a single “integral” or “interdependent” treaty
regime not open to any contracting out; in short, by expressly forbidding contract-
ing out, the clause predicates in unambiguous terms the incompatibility with the
treaty of any subsequent agreement concluded by a party which derogates from the
provisions of the treaty.64
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It has been suggested that under Article 311 the later inconsistent agreement
is unenforceable even between the parties to it, not simply illegal.65 Thus, if the
EU Regulation does fall within the terms of Article 311 it will not merely be
illegal as against non-EU states parties to UNCLOS, it will also be unenforce-
able as between EU member states, at least as a matter of international law.
The important question therefore is whether the EU double hull regulations
adversely affect the object and purpose of the Convention or the rights of par-
ties under the Convention. As presently drafted, the answer is almost certainly
no. As we saw above, port states have jurisdiction under general international
law to regulate matters affecting the good government of their ports—includ-
ing pollution control and construction standards. UNCLOS confers no general
right of entry to ports. Provided there is no discrimination in its application,
a ban on single hull tankers in EU ports does not appear to violate UNCLOS.
It thus entails no denial of UNCLOS rights and does not compromise the
object and purpose of the Convention.
But if any attempt is made to extend the EU regulation to enforce a ban on
passage of single hull tankers in the territorial sea or EEZ, UNCLOS rights
and the object and purpose of the Convention would be directly in issue, and
then Article 311(3) could come into play.
Conclusions
In the context of the modern law of the sea, codiﬁed in UNCLOS, and con-
strained by compulsory dispute settlement, unilateralism is unlikely to prove
productive for any state party, or for the EU. This is especially so if there is
no general international support for the proposed changes. As a policy option
for the EU, unilateralism must be used, if at all, with studied restraint if seri-
ous legal disputes are to be avoided.
The advance implementation of double-hull regulations for ships entering
EU ports is not a true example of unilateralism, however. It rests on no novel
jurisdictional claims, violates no rights of third parties, contravenes no article
of UNCLOS, and is not inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.
There is little for other states to object to in the Regulation. At most it imple-
ments in advance measures agreed internationally by IMO. But even without
parallel IMO measures, the EU would not be acting unlawfully; analogies with
previous unilateral action by Iceland, Canada or Chile are thus inappropriate
and misleading. Only if the regulations are subsequently applied to ships in
passage in the territorial sea or EEZ will a real problem of unilateral—and
potentially illegal—action arise.
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